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Abstract
Nepal is a country with a brutal history of endemic domestic conflict and
economic inequality. With the majority of the population living below the
poverty line, development discourse has been crucial to political discussions for
the past 20 years. The advent of the People‘s War marked a highly significant
turn in the history of Nepali politics as the formation of the United Communist
Party of Nepal (CPN-M) and the subsequent insurgency that followed brought
issues of socio-economic equality and empowerment of marginalized peoples to
the forefront of the national agenda. The CPN-M rapidly gained support
predominantly in the rural countryside and carried out a violent protracted
People‘s War in order bring about economic transformation. However, there has
been very little socio-economic change since the Maoists gained the majority of
seats in the Constituent Assembly despite promises of equality and improved
livelihoods throughout the bloody years of the war. This research seeks to
demonstrate how the Maoists were able to mobilize the masses and gain political
support through the strategic use of development as an incentive for joining the
rebellion. After having studied much of the Maoist literature published at the time
of the People‘s War as well as having spoken with several noteworthy Nepali
academics, I have provided an in depth analysis of the relationship between the
CPN-M and development over time. The research ultimately paints a clear
picture of two distinct dichotomies resulting from Maoist political activities in
Nepal: between development and destruction and growth and decline. Although
the Maoists have continually made promises to further develop Nepal and bring
the country into a state of stability and economic prosperity, the social structure
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of Nepal remains unchanged and underdeveloped. This research presents an
alternative theory for the tactics used by the Maoists to gain political support and
how these tactics have affected development activities in Nepal over the past 15
years.
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Introduction
The Nepalese society at the beginning of the 21st century is passing
through the greatest upheavals in its entire history in the form of the
revolutionary People‘s War of the oppressed classes, regions,
nationalities, gender and communities against the outmoded semi-feudal
and semi-colonial social order (Dr. Baburam Bhattarai 2003).
Nepal—consistently ranked amongst the poorest and least developed
countries in the world—has been brutally scarred by a political history wrought
with violence, corruption and conflict. The political events of the past 20 years
are of particular significance to the current deadlock persisting within the
Constituent Assembly and to the future of development in Nepal. The present
situation is such that thousands of development organizations have carved out a
political and economic niche for themselves while the Communist Party of
Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) has struggled to recover from the detrimental effects of
the People‘s War by legitimizing themselves within the political framework of
the Nepali government. However, despite the ceasing of gunfire in the early years
of the 21st century, Nepal continues to real under abject poverty, political
stalemate, weak economic conditions and widespread, rampant
underdevelopment.
The People‘s War, initiated by the CPN-M in 1996 ultimately laid the
foundation for the immediate future of Nepali politics. Nepal continues to be one
of the poorest countries in the world with 55 percent of the population falling
below the international poverty line of $1.25 US dollars a day (USAID 2010). A
victim of natural disasters, food shortage and poverty, development in Nepal is a
both a necessity and a topic of much debate. Additionally, with no legitimate
government to speak of, and a Maoist majority in the Constituent Assembly
preventing any legislation from being carried out, we must look to the past for
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understanding, explanation and to determine a connection between development
in Nepal and the CPN-M. Several questions must be raised including: Why is
there a Maoist majority in the Constituent Assembly? How were the Maoists able
to gain support during the preliminary stages of their political formation? How
were they able to mobilize the masses ultimately resulting in a violent insurgency
and integration within mainstream Nepali politics? Will the Maoists develop
Nepal? All of these questions are important for contextualizing both the
importance of development in Nepal and the power of the Maoists within the
current political situation.
The intention of this paper is to demonstrate that since the formal
inception of the CPN-M political party in 1995, the Maoists have used
development as an effective power tool. Promises of elevated livelihoods,
improved living conditions, and self-reliant development for all of Nepal were
political strategies employed by the Maoists in the preliminary and ensuing years
of the People‘s War for the purposes of mobilizing the masses and co-opting rural
peoples, gaining support and ultimately obtaining political power. In other words,
I argue that the proclamations of development made by the Maoists were ulterior
motives and means for gaining power during the late 20th and early 21st centuries.
As we can observe from the current political situation in which the Maoists form
the majority of the legislative body, this particular strategy has proven successful.
Given these conditions, the interactions between the CPN-Maoists and foreign
development agencies are of increasing significance to the current economic and
political situation of Nepal which warrants an examination of the past
development agendas of the CPN-M, particularly during the time of the
insurgency.
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Methodology
In order to properly carry out this research and do justice to the proposed
topic, it was imperative that I spend ample time familiarizing myself with the
historical trajectory of the Maoist movement by reading publications written by
and about the Maoists from the past 15 years. In doing so, I was able to determine
biases and recognize false promises or exaggerations. Additionally, by looking at
several economic growth charts, I was able to further understand the accuracy of
many statements and see the reality of many situations. I supplemented my
extensive book research with 4 semi-structured detailed interviews with
noteworthy Nepali academics and one interview with a Maoist leader. This was
both fundamental to my research findings, and also a potential factor that may
have altered or limited my findings. By only interviewing scholars, I did not
necessarily get the opinions and perspectives of those populations who were
either recruited to the Maoist cause or were directly affected (either socially or
financially) by the Maoist insurgency. Speaking with laypeople would have
added a different dimension to this research and possibly resulted in a different
outcome. However, due to issues of practicality, this was not possible as many of
these people live in the Western most regions of Nepal. Also, after speaking with
several academics, it became clear that I needed to keep consistent with the type
of people I was interviewing, or radically change the methodology of my
research.
Each interview was semi-structured in that I had prepared a list of fixed
questions which were open-ended and meant to prompt discussion. The
interviews consisted of a back and forth dialogue between me and the participant.
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All interview participants were made to sign a full and informed consent form
and were given the option of speaking anonymously or off the record. I recorded
the first 3 interviews, but then decided to play a more participatory role in the
interviews by conversing more and taking more hand written notes. Due to the
sensitive nature of this topic, I had expected to encounter some hesitation
particularly in my interview with Maoist leader as I figured they would not want
to have their interview included in the research paper. However, Maoist leader,
Kul Prasad KC was more than complacent and happy to offer insight and opinion
on all of my questions.
My research was ultimately limited by the fact that I was only able to
interview one Maoist leader. Gaining the Maoist perspective through literature
and through discussion are two very different experiences which I believe would
have been very complimentary to each other had I been given the opportunity to
interview more members of the CPN-M. It proved a very difficult feat to get in
touch with individuals who were knowledgeable about this topic, residing in
Nepal and willing to meet with me. For these reasons, I was only able to
complete 5 extensive interviews. Additionally, I was unable to meet with anyone
representing a development agency, but not for lack of trying. I repeatedly
contacted several development agencies including USAID, DFID, and the Swiss
Agency for International Development, but was never actually able to meet with
an individual. I would have loved to have more of a development perspective as it
would have contributed greatly to several sections of this paper. Time was also a
limiting factor for this research. One month was hardly enough time to complete
and in depth analysis of the Maoists and development. Many people I had
originally wanted to interview were out of the country and perhaps if I had more
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time, I would have been able to arrange a visit to several districts with a strong
Maoist presence. Overall, my methodology was very simple as it mainly
consisted of desk research. The following sections represent my findings and
analysis of the information I was able to retrieve during the research period using
the above stated methods.
Research Findings
Defining Development:
How to Understand Development in the Context of Nepal
Development in Nepal has been encouraged by the presence of many of
foreign aid donors and thousands of do-good nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) that have made a permanent niche for themselves in the context of
improving the livelihoods of the Nepali people and in so doing, promoting a path
towards modernity. According to data from the Social Welfare Commission,
updated as recently as August of this year, there are currently 191 international
nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and 21,285 NGOs registered with the
Commission—not including the presence of established branches of foreign aid
ministries from various Western countries such as the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the Department for International
Development (DFID) from the U.K. (Social Welfare Council Data 2010). Given
the sheer volume of development efforts in Nepal, it becomes necessary to draw
upon a wide array of various definitions and theories in order to reach a common
understanding of how development is to be understood for the purposes of this
paper and in the context of Nepal.
Development—a word that bears endless connotations, implications and
definitions is also a word that stimulates the intellectual mind and frustrates the
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common optimist. It can be defined as a goal and primary concern of Western
nations and transnational organizations—a ―white man‘s burden‖ of sorts or the
―transformation of the poor into the assisted‖ (Escobar 1995). We can understand
it as an industry in which individuals make a profit by spearheading
entrepreneurial endeavors and as a sector that employs a vast number of
professionals and volunteers. Development can be a process associated with
growth and change by which Western powers alter, contribute to and/or involve
themselves in the livelihoods of Third World populations. Some say the concept
of development dates back to antiquity when Aristotle said, ―We begin at the
beginning and consider things in the process of their growth (Huntington 1971).‖
As modernization theory would have it, development can be understood as a
process of growth whereby societies are transformed simply from traditional to
modern (Huntington 1971). This theory, an incarnation of post-WWII
development activities, has created a standard by which to measure development
in ―The Third World‖—standards in accordance with Western values. The
dichotomy that modernization theory thus insinuates—that between the
traditional and the modern—is just one of the many foundations used to
understand the concept of development.
Many of the previously stated modes of approaching development often
result in the ―infantilization‖ of the Third World (Escobar 1995) and make it
nearly impossible to reach a standard definition that encompasses all of these
implied meanings. Thus, many people are often left confused, befuddled and
disillusioned with the development process. Therefore, for the purpose of
understanding this paper in a coherent manner and within the necessary context
of CPN-Maoist ideology, a definition written by prominent Maoist leader Dr.
Shornstein 10

Baburam Bhattarai will be used. Bhattarai divides development theory into two
camps: the Anglo-Saxon scholarship camp of the Neo-Classicists and the Marxist
scholarship camp based on historical materialism. The Neo-Classicist camp
includes the preceding definitions and theories and ―defines development more in
terms of economic growth, or as amorphous modernization and views
underdevelopment as its opposite, in terms of lack of economic growth or as an
original state of backwardness‖ (Bhattarai 2003). This definition easily
insinuates a colonial perspective in which the world is divided into ―civilized‖
and ―uncivilized‖ thus emphasizing the existence of a preexisting and limited
development model used by experts and professionals to categorize the Third
World (Escobar 1995). The Marxist definition of development, in line with
Maoist ideology and used by Dr. Bhattarai for his own personal research,
―regards development as a cumulative process of progressive transformation of
society to higher formations and sees underdevelopment as the concomitant
process of blockage to such transformation or distorted structuration primarily
articulated through retrograde internal and external class configurations‖
(Bhattarai 2003). Development in this way can be simply interpreted to mean the
positive transformation or elevation of society often associated with
underdevelopment which is the process of being obstructed from doing so by
means of class polarization or social immobility.
In discussing development in Nepal, it also becomes important to
determine how Nepalis view development in Nepal and see how they understand
themselves within the development framework. Stacey Pigg (1992) uses the
Nepali word for development, bikas, when speaking on this issue in order to draw
a unique distinction between the theories and models of development in academia
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and development meanings particular to Nepalese society. Before continuing to
the next section, I would like provide a brief quote from Dr. Pigg who has
conducted numerous studies on development in Nepal that offer insight into the
Nepali perspective: ―For Nepal, development—rather than the residues and scars
of imperialism—is the overt link between it and the West. Bikas is the term
through which Nepalis understand their relationship to other parts of the world‖
(Pigg 1992).
What’s Wrong with Nepal?
A Maoist Perspective on the Causal Mechanisms of Underdevelopment in
Nepal
In order to frame an argument for the Maoist uses of development in the
preliminary years of the People‘s War, it is first necessary to discuss different
perspectives and reasons why Nepal has fallen into Bhattarai‘s category of
underdevelopment and determine several factors that have hindered the
development process in Nepal. Bhattarai (2003) lays claim to the fact that Nepal
boasts an extremely unique case of underdevelopment owing to a variety of
factors which include; absence of direct colonial rule (semi-colonial experience
through British and Independent India); geographic diversity ranging from the
tropical terai at an altitude of 100m and the alpine Himalayas serving as the
tallest point in the world at more than 8800m; land-locked position between two
economic and political giants, or more commonly referred to as a yam between
two boulders (India and China); and finally the centuries old feudalistic sociopolitical system. These are just some of the contributing factors emphasized by
Dr. Bhattarai that have affected the ―development of underdevelopment‖
(Bhattarai 2003). On a more ideological, Marxian note, Bhattarai (2003)
attributes underdevelopment in Nepal to the non-development of productive
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forces, rather than distorted development or development dependent on external
powers. In other countries victim to the strains of underdevelopment, the core
issues have rather been the failure to realize the productive potentials of society.
Another major contributing factor has been the unequal organization of Nepali
society and the polarization between rich and poor, rural and urban. These two
issues—that of a low level development of productive forces and high levels of
economic inequality—are the primary causes of underdevelopment in Nepal,
according to Maoist literature (Bhattarai 2003).

The Maoist Insurgency: A Very Brief History
The history of the Maoist presence in Nepal is complex and differs largely
both in practice and intention during various time periods of great political
significance. A highly momentous political change occurred in 1990 which
included the restoration of democracy and the establishment of a multi-party
parliamentary system after many years of sudo-democratic monarchical rule.
Supposedly, the role of the King was reduced to that of a symbolic figurehead.
However the reality of this situation, emphasized strongly by the Maoists, was
that the King remained above the law and the monarchy ultimately prevailed
although behind the guise of an ambiguously worded constitution (Bhattarai
2002). Prominent Maoist political leader Baburam Bhattarai (2002) explained
that in the ensuing years, ―the country continued to reel under abject poverty,
inequality, dependency and all-round underdevelopment. Acute class exploitation
was accompanied by yet more onerous national, regional, gender and caste
oppression of the overwhelming majority of the population.‖ The repressive
political responses of the sudo-democracy further disenfranchised and
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disillusioned the rural and countryside populations and greatly contributed to the
growing support for the Maoists (Pettigrew and Shneiderman 2004). This sense
of frustration enabled the Maoists to mobilize the population by offering
promises of improvement that the current regime failed to provide (Pettigrew and
Shneiderman 2004).
It was the presence of these conditions that eventually spurred the
People‘s War initiated by the Maoists (CPN-M) in 1996. In February of that year,
the Maoists presented a 40 point list of demands to the Nepali Congress. The
demands ranged from abolishing the monarchy, restoring economic and social
justice, empowering women and Dalits and establishing a constituent assembly
(Pettigrew and Shneiderman 2004). When the demands were not met with any
seriousness, the Maoists went underground and a violent insurgency ensued
(Pettigrew and Shneiderman 2004). In an interview with prominent Nepali
scholar Dr. Krishna Bhattachan, Bhattachan explained that the rejection of the 40
point demands by the Prime Minister at this time was one of the biggest mistakes
in the political history of Nepal and ultimately prompted the beginning of the
People‘s War. Within five years, the Maoists succeeded in mobilizing nearly the
entire countryside of Nepal (Bhattarai 2002). The proceeding years were filled
with violence, bloodshed and political catastrophe. As C.K. Lal (2001) says,
―when the gun starts to speak, verbal communication gets silenced‖ a prominent
theme in Nepali politics for two long decades.

The Maoist Literature and It’s Ties to Development
The CPN-Maoist party exhibits a strong history of anti-development
sentiment, especially towards efforts made by foreign powers. Dr. Baburam
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Bhattarai, a leading ideologue and intellectual of the Maoist movement and
former Finance Minister for the Nepali government summarized the Maoist
opinion of foreign intervention in Nepali political matters in his reaction to the
2003 peace talks by saying, ―most of the rulers of the semi-colonial and
dependent third world countries are just the puppets in the hands of their foreign
imperialist masters‖ (Bhattarai 2003). The intensity that this statement espouses
is likewise highlighted by several other academics. Jason Hart (2003) argues that
there is a concern on the part of the Maoists that international development
agencies are simply ―agents of imperialism‖ and a way in which foreign
governments are able to position themselves within the Nepali political and
developmental arena. Imperialism appears as a constant theme in this literature
and in the discussion of the Maoist position on development in Nepal.
In 2003, the CPN-M drafted a document entitled ―The Minimum Content
of the New Constitution.‖ Several provisions put forward by the Maoists are
directly in line with several definitions of development that I have come across
during this research process. For example, one of the provisions demands that
education, health and employment be made fundamental rights of the people and
free universal basic education and health services should be ensured to all (CPNM 2003). This is reflective of the Maoist version of development expressed to me
by Kul Prasad KC, (more commonly referred to as ‗Sonam‘) a politburo member
and leader of the Young Communist League (YCL), during an interview when he
defined development as having 4 distinct bases which include Education, Health,
Housing and Basic Needs/Services (i.e. food, water, etc.). Dr. Janardan Sharma
of the Sangam Institute defined development as a series of necessary conditions
including social welfare, education, opportunities, basic services and
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employment. Additionally, Dev Raj Dahal explained that development must fill
two conditions: it must set people free and fulfill basic needs. According to these
definitions as well as those stated in the previous sections of this paper, many of
the Maoist demands, promises, declarations and publications clearly reflect a
desire and determination for development in Nepal.
In the list of 40 point demands submitted to Prime Minister Sher Bahadur
Deuba, several demands reflect development potential including the demand for
gender equality and an end to racial exploitation as well as the abolition of the
‗untouchability‘ system, the right to education, free healthcare, expression and
freedom of press, the guarantee of employment and minimum wage and the
provision of drinking water, roads, and electricity (CPN-M 1996). In the
interview with Dr. Krishna Bhattachan, he argued that ultimately, because of the
40 point demands, the insurgency was made possible in two ways. Firstly, the
Maoists were responsible for bringing these issues of development and inequality
into the national agenda. They were able to demonstrate the importance and
necessity of solving these kinds of problems. Secondly, upon receiving the 40
demands, Prime Minister Deuba outwardly and blatantly rejected them which
Bhattachan says instigated the onset of the People‘s War. The fact that the
demands were not met with any seriousness further incited the Maoists to take up
the arms and formally rebel.

The Strategic Use of Development in the Mobilization of the Masses
Several arguments have been made that the Maoist uprising itself is a
direct result of development attempts and activities. Kishor Sharma (2005) claims
that the failure of development in Nepal along with the corruption of political
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institutions has created a breeding ground for conflict and civil war. As
mentioned previously in the works of Seddon and Hussein, development efforts
in Nepal dramatically failed to improve the livelihood of the nation‘s poor and
have actually contributed to unemployment, poverty and inequality between the
rural and the urban (Hussein and Seddon 2002) (Sharma 2005). These factors
contribute greatly to frustration amongst the disadvantaged populations and
breeds resentment.
By the time the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in
November 2006, the CPN-M had gone from consisting of a few dozen fighters in
1996 to over 50,000 fighters 10 years later (Eck 2010). How and why was this
possible? One of the main reasons that the CPN-M had so much success in
gaining the support of the rural population was that after the democratic change
of 1990, people were optimistic that they would be involved in the political
process and it would bring them economic opportunities, equality, and social
justice (Joshi 2010). However, as I have previously mentioned, the new regime
failed to address the grievances of the rural peoples and neglected the needs of
the majority of the population. In their recruitment strategies and in an effort to
mobilize the countryside, the Maoists highlighted many justifications for their
war on the Nepali state including the prolonged continuation of social and
economic inequality, geographic and polarized disparity, poor and corrupt
governance and repression of the Nepali people by the state (Eck 2010).
Classical recruitment literature seeks to determine why individuals
become motivated to join rebellion movements. The discourse addresses the issue
of whether people are more apt to take part in a rebellion for ―loot-seeking‖
reasons or because of their personal grievances (Eck 2010). Other factors that
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may motivate an individual to join a rebellion movement include geography,
ethnicity, ideology and religion. Kristine Eck (2010) argues that indoctrination
and political education were the primary means of successful recruitment by the
Maoists. ―By linking villagers‘ dissatisfaction with their daily lives to larger
problems in the political system, the CPN-M was able to exploit grievances for
the purpose of rebel recruitment‖ (Eck 2010). This theory demonstrates how the
Maoists were able to expose the poor living conditions and disadvantaged
livelihoods of the rural populations. Participation in the insurgency became a
viable option for many as the Maoists offered a means of social change through
joining the rebellion.
For example, in 1995, the Maoists initiated a year-long campaign to gain
the support of the peasant populations of Rolpa, Rukum, and Jajarkot in Western
Nepal. Political-cultural teams would visit these districts to organize the
peasantry to challenge local authorities and advocate for infrastructure
improvement and ultimately gain the political support of these populations (Eck
2010). Other means of recruitment employed by the CPN-M included mass
gathering that emphasized the importance of armed struggle and a protracted
People‘s War for improving the lives of villagers. There gatherings often
incorporated the use of cultural performances, songs, and poems to win over the
people to the cause of People‘s War (Eck 2010). Another means of recruitment
consisted of the use of ―individual motivators‖ who would go door-to-door to
discuss the grievances of villagers and relate them to the cause of the Maoist
movement, thus enlisting the support and gaining the trust of many individuals
(Eck 2010). According to Kristine Eck (2010), these campaigns were highly
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successful in marketing the Maoist movement to the public by demonstrating the
potential benefits of joining the movement.

The CPN-M cleverly linked villager‘s grievances about their everyday
situation with the larger Maoist ideology, attracting recruits by employing
local idiom. At the same time it ensured that all members were educated
in Maoist ideology, guaranteeing not only commitment to the cause, but
also that the diverse individuals which composed the CPN-M were united
by this ideology (Eck 2010).
Another way in which development can be linked to the recruitment
strategies of the Maoists is through the informal nature of Nepal‘s economy and
the social inequality that naturally stems from this. In an interview with
noteworthy Nepali academic, Dev Raj Dahal from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Foundation Office, Dahal explained to me that the majority of Nepali society and
economic functions are based on informal systems and relations as 90 percent of
the economy consists of informal subsistence agriculture. While the informal
system remains very strong, the formal process has been in a state of deadlock for
many years. This ultimately means that the state has been unable to bring the
majority of Nepal into the formal modern economy thus further disenfranchising
the people and their unequal positions within society. This has forced agriculture
workers to rely heavily on the informal sector in order earn a meager living. One
of the ways in which this has manifested itself is through the establishment of
informal patron-client relationships in the rural areas. Madhav Joshi (2010)
argues that the existence of oppressive patron-client relationships in the rural
regions of Nepal further contributed to the grievances of these populations by
increasing their dependence on local landed elites.
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As Dahal mentioned, a vast majority of Nepal‘s population is
concentrated within subsistence cultivation. Land ownership is a crucial aspect of
subsistence agriculture and peasant households, but also an expensive and
difficult thing to obtain. Because of the persistence of social inequality and thus
inequality in land ownership, many peasant populations were forced to seek the
assistance and patronage of the local landed elite (Joshi 2010). The elite were
able to provide the peasants with land and other basic services in exchange for a
mix of rent, crop shares, free labor and political support by following instructions
on who to vote for. This forms the basis of a patron-client relationship in which
the bond is kept strong because the loss of a patron would ―cast peasants into the
pool of landless laborers, devoid of any subsistence securities and exposed to
market uncertainties for land, labor and food‖ (Joshi 2010). Now, how do the
Maoists tie in? As mentioned previously, the 1990 political shift to democracy
brought no changes to land ownership reforms and social welfare programs, even
though these were promises made in the election manifestos of several political
parties. As can be imagined, the rural populations involved in clientelistic
relationships became further disenfranchised with the political process as they
were in a vulnerable position and unable to enact any kind of progressive change
through the democratic process (Joshi 2010). The autonomy of peasant political
behavior was severely limited and in this way, Joshi (2010) suggests that the
Maoists were able to play upon their grievances and propose armed insurgency as
―a means to realize people‘s expectations.‖ Landlords and local elites became
quick and easy targets of the Maoist insurgency because they were able to both
challenge the feudal state and reduce the costs for the peasants to join the
insurgency (Joshi 2010). The clientelistic bonds were destroyed and the local
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elites were driven out—replaced by the Maoists who offered promises of land
security and debt relief. ―The CPN-M made it extremely clear that should they
come to power, the peasantry would have access to a multitude of political,
economic and social goods currently unavailable to them. Such promises may
have outweighed the risks of joining particularly when so many had so little to
lose‖ (Eck 2010).
Moving forward several years to the Constituent Assembly elections of
2006 in which the Maoists gained an overwhelming majority of the Assembly,
we must look at the reasons behind their victory after 10 years of brutal war.
When observing the details of the election patterns, it is clear that the majority of
the population voted for the social, economic and political change that the
Maoists promised to bring upon their electoral win. Mahendra Lawoti (2010)
argues that this is because the Maoists not only gained the majority of the rural
vote, they also succeeded in winning seats in the urban districts of Kathmandu
and Lalitpur where elections were have said to be free and fair. Additionally, the
Maoists took many votes away from Nepali Congress Party and gained majorities
in districts previously devoted to the CPN-UML (Communist Party of NepalUnited Marxist Leninist) (Lawoti 2010). The population‘s realization of their
need for change and better services was not necessarily only measured by
Maoists gains, but also by the votes received by the Madhesi and indigenous
nationalities‘ who were also fighting for socio-economic equality and political
change (Lawoti 2010).
The seriousness of the Maoists in their goals to empower the Dalits and
women was made very clear when they presented the most inclusive list for the
First Past the Post (FPTP) elections consisting of Dalits, indigenous nationalities,
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Madhesi, women and youth candidates (Lawoti 2010). This kind of activity
exemplifies the progressive nature of Maoists and their intentions to empower
marginalized populations and can easily be considered a form of social
development. ―The Maoist win was also helped by their liberal promises. They
promised different things to different groups facing discrimination and inequality.
In a society of severe inequality and scarcity, hope and promises may have been
better than no promises or hope‖ (Lawoti 2010).

Discussion/Analysis
The Dichotomies between Development and Destruction, Growth and
Decline
We have said that ultimately the process of destruction is not only the
process of destruction; it is also the process of construction. Without
destruction there will not be construction…Like Mao said, people usually
think that war is very destructive, war is very bad, it kills people, all these
things. But people do not understand that war is a great process of
construction. War has a very big cleansing effect. We also try to teach the
people and train the cadres to understand this (Prachanda 1999).
The past 15 years of Maoist political history sparks many debates on their
intentions and their success and raises several ideological issues. Given my
research findings, I think it is clear that the Maoist actions before, during and
after the People‘s War can be understood through two distinct dichotomies. The
first is between development and destruction. As it has been reiterated several
times throughout the course of this paper, the Maoists have been very adamant
about the need for development in Nepal. They have used development as a
strategic way to recruit followers and have used it as the foundation of their
political campaigns. In a 1999 interview, former Maoist Prime Minister, Puspa
Kamal Dahal (a.k.a. Prachanda) spoke about the need for socialism in bringing
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Nepal out of its immobile stage of underdevelopment. He said, ―More than 72%
of the Nepalese people live below the poverty line. This is a grave situation. We
have always explained to the people that nothing can be achieved from this multiparty system—that it is fake, it is imperialist, it is feudal‖ (Prachanda 1999). This
point was reiterated to me by Kul Prasad KC, (more commonly referred to as
‗Sonam‘) a politburo member and leader of the Young Communist League
(YCL), during an interview when he strongly emphasized that one-party and
multi-party systems cannot solve problems of society. Only socialist systems
contain the respect and cooperation that is needed to initiate social change.
However, despite promises of a new state and an end to social inequality, very
little reform was carried out while the Maoists were in power for nine months and
very little is being accomplished presently. Additionally, it can be argued that
very few improvements were made to the amount of people living below the
poverty line and to the provision of basic services for these people.
Social services were drastically affected by the escalation of the People‘s
War and its subsequent destruction of infrastructure in the 1990s. Because of an
increase in defense spending by the government, fewer funds were available for
investment in the social sector. By July 2003, the Maoists were responsible for
the destruction 1,683 (43%) of Village Development Committee office buildings
as well as many police posts, airports, electricity power stations and substations,
telecommunication towers and bridges (Lawoti and Pahari 2010). Schools were
vandalized and forced to close and the threat of violence and general strikes
frightened away many INGO and NGO development programs in rural areas
occupied by the Maoists. This blatant attack on Nepal‘s infrastructure and
development activities exemplifies a dichotomous relationship between the
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Maoist dialogue of development and the reality of their destructive actions. In a
sense, the People‘s War actually pushed Nepal further backwards into a state of
severe underdevelopment and conflict. According to the above quote from
Prachanda, destruction is a necessary precondition of development. However, the
failure of the Maoists to enact any kind of social and economic change since their
integration into the formal government is a key factor that has been emphasized
and reiterated by a multitude of academics, intellectuals and the general
population. The Maoists ―shook the foundation of Nepal but haven‘t provided
any solutions,‖ says Janardan Sharma; ―Rural development discourse has been
romanticized by the Maoists…they haven‘t delivered‖ says Hari Sharma of the
Social Science Baha; ―After destruction, what is next? Reconstruction. This is not
happening in Nepal. We need a peace process first,‖ says Krishna Bhattachan.
The sentiments expressed by these renowned scholars are typical of the
frustration felt by many with the failure of the Maoists to live up to their promise
to bring about significant socio-economic change, spur development and improve
living conditions. They demonstrate the intricate relationship between
development and destruction in Nepal as a result of the Maoist presence.
The other dichotomy that can be derived from my research findings is
between growth and decline. The primary goal of the People‘s War was to bring
about economic transformation which was also how the insurgency was able to
gain so much momentum. However, the impact on Nepal‘s economy has been
undeniably negative and has actually stunted economic growth in Nepal. Between
1987-88 to 1994-95, GDP growth was 4.1%, between 1995-2000 it was at 5%
(we can speculate that this is a result from the mobilization of the population
during this time), but when the struggle escalated in 2001-2, GDP growth
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declined to 2.7% (Lawoti and Pahari 2010). Lawoti and Pahari (2010) attribute
this decline to the occurrence of several factors resulting from the People‘s War.
Firstly, tourism declined more than 43% (Perry 2005) during the war as a result
of political insecurity and negative publicity; there was disinvestment in the
manufacturing and service sectors because of lack of law and order as well as
closures and extortions by the insurgents. The Maoists did not pay off their credit
for goods taken from the hill regions and thus the capital of many small traders
dried up and food security was threatened, many banks were looted and
industries destroyed (Lawoti and Pahari 2010) and the economy was
subsequently collapsing as exports and foreign aid were cancelled (Perry 2005).
―In a country where the average person scrapes by on an income of $240 a year,
many have fled to brothels in Bombay, sweatshops in Southeast Asia and
servants‘ quarters in the Gulf: trade unions say 7 million out of 27 million
Nepalis now live abroad‖ (Perry 2005). As the Maoists continued their
campaigns with the intention of bringing the population out of a state of
underdevelopment and misery, the economy in fact declined as a direct result of
their actions. Again, although Prachanda claimed that destruction and therefore
decline were necessary to development and growth, the majority of Nepal still
remains in a state of extreme poverty showing no signs of economic
improvement, especially with the current stalemate in the Constituent Assembly.
―It‘s almost impossible to fathom what a poorer Nepal would be like, [but] I
guess you move from disease to epidemic, and malnutrition to starvation. The
best possible scenario is that one of the world‘s poorest countries just gets
poorer‖ says the Human Rights Watch Deputy Director for Asia, Sam Zarifi in an
interview with Time magazine (Perry 2005).
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The dichotomy between destruction and development and growth and
decline are extremely relevant to the ongoing development discourse in Nepal
and essential to understanding my research findings. The present political
situation has ultimately driven Nepal into a state of stunted development and
distorted economic growth. I believe it is essential to address these dichotomies
in discussing the future potential of development in Nepal, especially if the
Maoists are to remain a majority in the Constituent Assembly. If development is
to remain a serious goal of the Nepali government and the CPN-M, these issues
of destruction and decline must be recognized. ―It is crucial to remember that
political mobilization does not automatically translate into economic and resource
mobilization. While the CPN-M and others inspired by its success have
mobilized sizeable masses and stirred their aspirations, the profile of economic
assets and possibilities in Nepal remains unchanged‖ (Lawoti and Pahari 2010).

Conclusion
Stacy Pigg (1992) says, ―Everyone‘s tomorrow will (or should) look like
some people‘s present.‖ It is this mentality that has spurred so much conflict
within the confines of Nepali politics. The need for development in Nepal is
made clear by the extreme living conditions of the majority population and
Nepal‘s international ranking as one of the poorest countries in the world. After
the political change of 1990, the Nepali people reached a point of complete
frustration and disillusionment with the government and its failure to take action
against the social and economic inequality experienced by so many. Thus, the
formation of the CPN-M political party occurred at a crucial stage of Nepali
political history. The Maoists made clear their intentions to bring about social and
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economic transformation by destroying the feudalistic systems and replacing
them with a new people‘s democracy. During the mid-1990s, the Maoists
succeeded in mobilizing thousands of people who were disenfranchised from the
political process and eager to engage in activities that would improve their
livelihoods. The Maoist promises of development were contradictory in that
throughout the 10 years of the People‘s War, the Maoists were responsible for the
destruction of infrastructure, the stalled development process, and the further
demise of Nepal‘s economy. The years of violence that ensued contributed
greatly to the current state of the Nepali political situation—that of complete
dysfunction and deadlock. However, it was ultimately the promise and desire for
development, a transition from the traditional to the modern that ignited the flame
of the Maoist movement and secured the future of a Maoist political presence in
Nepal. The incongruous relationship between what the Maoists said and what
they did has precipitated a situation in which once again, the people are frustrated
and disillusioned with the political process. Nepal‘s path towards development
has ultimately been hindered by the actions of the Maoists, despite their noble
intentions to create an equal and prosperous Nepali society.
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